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Abstract. This article highlighting the political and ideological conditions neces-
sary for globalization and the role of the technologies associated with this process 
is an attempt to explain the nature and dynamics of change in food chains. In this 
text, a political-economic perspective is employed, relying on well-known theo-
retical and empirical examples that abound in the literature about globalization 
of food, and on the underlying theoretical explanation of the structural changes 
brought about or intensified by the globalization process.
It seeks to understand the logic and dynamic that explains why the corporate 
retailers became the main economic motors of deep and rapid changes in food 
chains and after a short appraisal of the effects of the changes it seeks to identify 
the winners and losers of the process.
Introduction
Since the beginning of the 1990s, a substantial body of literature has addressed the 
theme of the globalization of the agri-food system. After the seminal publication 
edited by Bonanno et al. (1994a) focusing on the role of transnational corporations 
(TNCs) in the global agri-food system, a broader perspective of TNCs as actors in 
global governance emerged. More recently, aiming at examining ‘the political role 
that corporations play in efforts to govern the global food system’, Clapp and Fuchs 
(2009, p. 2, emphases in original) edited their book seeking ‘cross-referencing be-
tween these two literatures’.
This article results from an attempt to build up a pedagogical narrative inspired 
by the commodity systems methodology,1 about a perspective that, to my knowl-
edge, did not receive enough attention from the above-mentioned literature. That is, 
I will try to highlight the political and ideological conditions necessary for globali-
zation. Also, I will stress the role of those pieces of technology associated with this 
process in order to explain the nature and dynamics of change in food chains.2 I am 
aware that a detailed argumentation about all the issues involved could not be sat-
isfactorily provided in a single article with page limitation; however, I feel that the 
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main argument and other minor findings should be discussed by a broad audience 
of agri-food researchers.
This attempt follows a political-economic perspective, meaning that, besides 
seeking to understand the nature and dynamics of changes, an effort will be made to 
assess the importance and effects of those changes and to identify the winners and 
the losers in the process.
The article starts with a very short description of the overall globalization con-
text, stressing the political/ideological conditions that, during the last decades of the 
twentieth century, paved the way for the emergence of intermediation-driven global 
capital3 as the dominant forms of capital, relegating most of producer-driven capital 
to a secondary place. Then, the main drivers are identified that explain why the great 
distributors/retailers became the leading economic driving force of the food chains, 
and it intends to show relevant technological features involved in those changes.4
This approach relies on well-known theoretical developments and on empirical 
examples that abound in the globalization literature and, particularly, in that of the 
globalization of food.5 Seeking an explanation for the processes of change it also 
appeals to the concept of the technological treadmill (Cochrane, 1979). This helps to 
clarify the dynamics of change and illustrates the structural effects of the adoption 
of technological innovations.
The text is organized as follows: the second section aims to link the changes in 
food chains to the context of globalization, highlighting the technological and the 
politically driven changes. In the third section, the structural impacts resulting from 
the changes in food chains are addressed, followed by some conclusive remarks that 
attempt to identify the winners and losers.
The Context of Globalization
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the literature about globalization in gen-
eral and particularly that involving food issues.6 Nevertheless and taking the risk of 
being too schematic, I think that it is important to focus on the concept (see Box 1, 
where the most relevant features of the process are displayed). The current globali-
zation phase of the capitalist system emerged in the 1970s as a result of the political 
will and actions of a new generation of governments, pioneered by Thatcher in the 
UK. Political action inspired on the neo-liberal ideology that had become hegemonic 
after a relatively long process of gestation; a process that resulted from the ideologi-
cal and political project to shape the future of capitalist development. This process, 
financed by very wealthy people, started before World War II and succeeded in en-
rolling leading people from the academic orthodoxy, namely economists from the 
Chicago and Austrian schools, in networks of think-tanks in association with opin-
ion makers, business men and politicians (Busch, 2010).
My understanding of the process is the following: probably the most remarkable 
feature of this globalization period is the shift of power between the types of capital, 
highly associated with the revolutions in information technologies (IT), transport 
and logistics, as well as with state-led decisions that make possible worldwide trade 
liberalization, and the other features involved in the Washington Consensus.7 That 
is, corporations involved in intermediation – either financial or commercial – are 
the winners of the process due to their ability to better take advantage of the emerg-
ing technologies that represent a prerequisite of globalization, as well as from the 
change of the nature of the state induced by the neo-liberal ideology.
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Concerning food chains, some technologies that will be mentioned below have 
been instrumental in granting a decisive competitive advantage to the corporations 
able to take full profit through them, meaning that the well-managed adopters were 
able to gain competitive advantages that constitute a remarkable leverage for a self-
reinforcing process, favoring the constitution of oligopolies. I refer particularly, but 
not exclusively, to the corporations involved in distribution and retailing in the area 
of the food chain in which the effective power and control is located (Dixon, 2002).
Even rejecting technological determinism, one must acknowledge that techno-
logically driven innovations have been determinant to allow large corporations to 
take advantage of their position along the agri-food chains at the global level, to gain 
market power and capacity to enter a reinforcing process, while small players on the 
chain are frequently the subject of a squeeze between giants located at the upstream 
and at the downstream of the chain.
Evidence supporting the argument is illustrated by the growing importance of 
the finance sector due to liberalization and deregulation to grant free rein to capital, 
coupled with IT paving the way to the emergence of the virtual economy, based 
firmly in speculation,8 and by the sudden entrance of a few distribution or retail 
agents directly into the top rankings of the most important corporations, such as 
Wal-Mart, Carrefour, Tesco, Metro, Kroeger and Ahold, all of them involved in food 
supply (Hughes, 1996).
The Dynamics of Change of Food Chains9
In order to understand the logic and dynamics of change, it is worthwhile to regard 
the changing process as the result of a system of forces entailing dialectic relations 
Box 1. Globalization determinants and consequences.
• Technological change as a prerequisite. Revolution in transport, information technologies (IT) and 
logistics (generalization of containers).
• Neo-liberal policies, starting with Thatcher in UK and Reagan in the US and then followed vol-
untarily by other countries, while being imposed by the IMF on indebted developing countries. 
Policies that became known as the Washington Consensus, particularly the following recommen-
dations (impositions):
- Privatization aimed at expanding the reach of private capital under the ideological claim that 
this is a more efficient way to assure the provision of public goods.
- Liberalization of trade: GATT is transformed into WTO, including agricultural trade. Regional 
agreements such as NAFTA in North America or the expanding Common Market in Europe. 
Countries such China or India become huge commercial players. Offshoring of services and 
of productive operations resulting in international outsourcing becoming common practice. 
Fordism came to an end and new methods of flexible management emerged, such as just-in-
time.
- Deregulation (re-regulation Bonanno et al. (1994b) or neo-regulation (Otero and Pechlaner, 
2010). From a state regulator to a state facilitator (McMichael and Myhre, 1991) and a shift 
from TNCs adapting to the state regulations to imposing conditions on the state, either in 
developed or in developing countries (Moreira, 1994).
• Empowerment of finance capital: financial tyranny (Fitoussi, 1997) and the capture of the state by 
the financial system (Johnson, 2009).
• Financial speculation recently aimed at food commodities, as a source of huge price volatility, af-
fecting essentially the developing poor (Ghosh, 2009).
• Change in the balance of power between labour and capital. Capital gained more freedom of 
movement and in many countries public perception gives a more benevolent look at the inequali-
ties of wealth, while labour lost most of its influence over the state apparatus and unions lost 
much of their attractiveness. Furthermore, labour had to deal with the fear of unemployment, 
due to the generalization of outsourcing and offshoring, an efficient way to self-restrain wage 
and other benefits claims as well as to force labour to accept the flexibility so praised by market 
fundamentalists.
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from which I will underline those involving issues related with: (i) capital accumula-
tion; (ii) consumer behaviour; (iii) state regulations; and, particularly, (iv) technolo-
gy-driven innovation.
Capital Accumulation
The logic of capital accumulation appears not to need any particular explanation if 
one does not forget that its prime goal is the incessant quest for profits. Therefore, 
due to the overall pressure to build up a state facilitator of the requisites of capital, 
the concerns about, or the opposition to, the logic of capital accumulation are left 
only to the struggles driven by workers, consumers movements, radical alternative 
movements and/or people involved in grass-roots protests. These movements in-
volve very different actors, focusing usually on particular issues that express the 
changing and frequently limited concerns of the civil society.10
During this process, strong competition among capitalists was intensified and 
geographically extended, even when collaborations such as strategic alliances are 
formed. Furthermore, it should be stressed that an articulation between different 
types of capitalists and between them and non-capitalist forms of production/distri-
bution/retail11 is perfectly compatible with the logic of capital accumulation.
Since the 1980s, we have seen the emergence of new large transnational corpora-
tions gaining disproportionate market power while many old giants lost ground.
At this point a clarification must be made. A particularly well-informed observer, 
Robert Reich (2007, p. 10), states that large corporations lost much of their impor-
tance in the economy compared to the period that ends at the beginning of the 1970s. 
It seems that the positions are not contradictory and could be easily reconciled.
In fact, old giants dominated most of the US market, when this country absorbed 
the lion’s share of the industrial production of the globe, indeed loses its relative im-
portance due to the expanding reach of competition, as Reich argues. Nevertheless, 
with globalization new large players emerged: not only oligopolies involved in in-
formation technologies such as Microsoft, Google, Intel, Oracle, Cisco, etc., but also 
large corporations that took advantage of the technologically and politically driven 
changes to increase their market power. This happened in the financial sector12 and 
with the large retailers, of whom many were of a transnational character.
In short, successful oligopolies, while keeping fierce competition amongst them, 
place themselves in the most profitable segments of global chains leaving the less 
profitable to smaller actors.13 These most profitable segments are the result of the use 
of their own technologies protected by patents,14 or from a mix of new technologies 
(logistics and centralized purchasing centres) coupled with successful management, 
such as TNC retailers. Those corporations get enough competitive advantage to 
raise barriers to new competitors that might wish to enter the market.15 And, finally, 
this growing power is also favoured by mergers and acquisitions that characterize 
global businesses, taking advantage of the financial leverage made possible by in-
novations in finance.
The Behaviour of Consumers
Undeniably, consumers benefited from the globalization that made exotic and out-
of-season products affordable for mass consumption, opening up new possibilities 
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to adopt new types of diet, such as ethnic-driven cuisines (Appadurai, 1986). How-
ever, the other face of this coin is the emergence of concerns about the globaliza-
tion of food. Concerns originated essentially through fear about food safety (Allard, 
BSE, nitrofurans, dioxins, E. coli, Salmonellas, etc.) that, being amplified by the media, 
paved the way to the quest for the traceability of the most perishable foods and fa-
voured the establishment of private regulatory standards.
But consumer behaviour also involves a number of movements opposing glo-
balization that need to be taken into account even if not explored here (Lowe et al., 
2008). Ranging from the ones that radically contest the system, to others ethically or 
environmentally concerned that focus their actions on the functioning of the agri-
food productive systems (extensive versus intensive, organic production, etc.) or on 
support to the survival of local producers (fair trade) or local markets or demand 
guarantees about animal well-being.
State Regulations
When looking at state regulations, one must bear in mind that globalization brought 
deep changes to regulation (Marsden, 1999; Busch and Bain, 2004). In certain cases, 
existing regulations were circumvented through processes such as the replacement 
by others more favorable to capital accumulation or by a less effective enforcement 
of existing laws.16 Furthermore, as Busch (2010, p. 334) put it, ‘strategies of supply 
chain management (SCM) and the tripartite standard regime (TSR)17 have provided 
large firms with new ways of acting in a neoliberal world’.
This does not mean that state intervention disappeared, but only that it changed 
the intervention focus from  direct economic intervention to other types of regula-
tion, such as TSR or planning regulations (Griffith and Harmgart, 2008), as well as 
measures aimed at facing sanitary, health and animal well-being concerns, approved 
by the European Union and more or less enforced by member states.
Technology-driven Innovations
Addressing innovation and new technologies, it is worth mentioning that while they 
are made available by the technoscience system, the moment and pace of its adop-
tion is determined by the logic of capital accumulation.
As already mentioned, transport and IT were a precondition for globalization 
since they have an enormous potential to reduce costs, to promote trade, and to im-
prove efficiency in global chains. Higher velocity and more tons of freight per unit 
of transport, as well as the less known gains obtained from the generalization of the 
container,18 substantially increased productivity, diminished costs of long distance 
trade, and facilitated logistical gains. The recent possibility to transfer all relevant 
information in real time, using Intranet and/or the public Internet, only costs a small 
fraction of the past costs. Indeed, the use of IT has been crucial to achieve new levels 
of efficiency in logistics and in long distance management and control, measured 
either in terms of gains of time and/or quality of service.
These technologies were instrumental in the emergence of the most important 
innovation within the supply chain. I refer here to the implementation of highly cen-
tralized forms of acquisitions, through giant purchase centres able to supply several 
sales points of a particular group within a strategically defined geographical area, 
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which, as often happens in the European Union, frequently have a transnational 
character.
Other technologies contribute to the success of these purchase centres, adding to 
gains in efficiency and reduction of functioning cost. Especially among them, the 
electronically enabled supply chains that radically transformed the velocity, quan-
tity and quality of information between the actors that participate in supply chains.19
It is worth noting that these technologies constitute a threat to some intermediate 
agents in supply chains facilitating direct access between producers and retailers, 
and therefore constituting an obvious means of permanent pressure to contain pric-
es at the intermediate level. And even if it could serve, in certain market segments, 
to by-pass the retailer when there is direct access between producer and final con-
sumer (Yao et al., 2007), it has been particularly important to the large distributors/
retailers.
Furthermore, IT allows the monitoring of trade and quality parameters, particu-
larly important to food chains, which are no longer a solely internal business re-
quirement necessary to obtain efficient logistics. In fact, in 2004, the monitoring pro-
cess became subject to EU regulation (Jedermann et al., 2006). These regulations go 
in parallel with innovations concerning the conditions of transport of live animals 
and transport and stocking of fresh produce, under rigorous control of temperature 
and atmospheric conditions.
Complementary to this is the expected generalization of radio frequency identifi-
cation (RFID),20 which, besides its further gains of efficiency, can be associated with 
sophisticated systems based on software improvements to allow the use of autono-
mous sensors to check the state of maturation of produce. There are already working 
prototypes to assure this form of traceability (Jedermann et al., 2006).
Concluding, even for arms-length trade, IT is decisive in making trading points 
more efficient and less dependent on the labour force. Large retailers pioneered these 
innovations but many of these technologies are spreading even to small retailers. 
This movement started with the generalization of the bar-code system that not only 
made possible the profitable use of the electronic points of sale, replacing the old 
register machine with visible speed gains, but also allowed automatic transmission 
of data necessary for a better management of the retail unit. The afore-mentioned 
RFID will increase the advantage of electronic points of sale, respond to concerns 
about the traceability of products, and contribute to a more efficient connection be-
tween retailers and suppliers. Moreover, those innovations not only serve to increase 
the productivity at the lower end of the supply chain, but also contribute to the es-
tablishment of partnerships replacing certain forms of competition.
Fast and cheaper transportation, coupled with more efficient logistics, means that 
distance and/or long distance trade gained importance, giving a new life to the tra-
ditional form of catalogue or TV sale but also the direct purchase via Internet, either 
directly from retailers or producers, namely the ones exploring niche markets, in-
volving real time payments using debit/credit cards or electronic transfers. How-
ever, one must recognize that these forms of distance retail trade only function well 
for certain types of products, since consumers are reticent to buy without previous 
inspection of their acquisitions. This situation is particularly felt at the markets for 
fresh fruit and vegetables, fish and meat.
To complete the description of technology-driven innovation, a brief mention 
must be made of the emergence of nanotechnologies,21 which could be seen as a 
source of future changes, particularly due to the ‘growing alliance between the cor-
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porate food sector and scientific communities… [that] strategically place the cor-
porate sector to shape the research trajectory and commercial applications of na-
notechnology, and the future of agri-food systems’, pointing to the emergence of a 
‘nano-corporate food paradigm’ (Scrinis and Lyons, 2007, p. 22). Nanotechnologies 
not only complete and extend the reach of known productive technologies, from 
precision farming to nutraceutical production, passing through the improving of 
quality, durability and shelf life of packaged foods, but can be coupled, at the nano-
level, with IT, allowing the generalization of the use of nano-sensors, which will 
reinforce large-scale production restructuring (Scrinis and Lyons, 2007, p. 22).
Impacts of Globalization on Food Chains
Impacts of globalization on food chains result from a number of factors. Without any 
pretension of being exhaustive, I will focus on the scale effects of the technology-
driven innovations and on the outcomes of an increasing worldwide competition.
Impacts Resulting from Scale Effects
Besides IT, the most visible and important scale effect stems from the centralized ac-
quisitions of purchase centres. These large infrastructures that only are profitable if 
significant quantities of products are to be exchanged allow these operators to obtain 
substantial discounts for large quantities, and simultaneously to impose minimum 
thresholds for the suppliers just to have access to the negotiation process.22
Size matters – by definition, strong market power makes these large players able 
to squeeze the prices paid to the producers or to force them to support marketing 
strategies supporting the costs of promotional sales. The competitive advantage of 
these operators is also reinforced by the extraordinary financial advantage of this 
type of business. In fact, different from small retailers that frequently accept delays in 
payment from their customers, corporate distributors/retailers do not maintain per-
sonal relations with consumers and any sale is immediately paid for: consequently, 
they do not suffer treasury risks due to unpaid debts. Furthermore, they can obtain 
substantial financial interest since they can take advantage of the gap between the 
sale and the 60–90 days during which they can delay payments to suppliers. Thus, it 
is obvious that this kind of business gives enormous financial leverage to corporate 
retailers, daily reinforcing the already considerable financial and market power of 
these actors, opening opportunities to mergers and acquisitions of competitors.
The results are obvious: on the one hand, many suppliers become entirely de-
pendent on a single buyer and, on the other hand, isolated producers and/or small 
associations or co-operatives could find themselves excluded from the segment of 
the market formed by the sale points connected with these purchase centres. Know-
ing that the market share of these purchase centres shows consistently rising lev-
els, the implications are clear: suppliers are forced to enter restructuring processes23 
solely to have access to the negotiation room.24
This means that any corporation able to establish these large centralizing acquisi-
tion centers can reinforce their market power on a daily basis to a point that, emulat-
ing identical procedures, becomes imperative for competitors to stay or to enter the 
business. This also means that the well-managed first innovators gained formidable 
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power and could erect entrance barriers against new competitors that have to find 
new places and new business strategies.25
This dynamic of food chains leads to a new market segmentation at the lower 
end of the food chain with a quite different distribution of power: on the one side, 
we find a small group of large distributors or retailers that rapidly gained market 
share and became oligopolies. And on the other side, there is a multitude of small 
retailers facing a diminishing market share, especially when they are not able to as-
sociate themselves in order to have their own large purchasing centres. This picture 
will be finished if we add to these two groups the isolated actors that voluntarily 
choose niche markets, which, by definition, are aimed at obtaining higher prices 
but, given their niche character, cannot expand beyond restricted limits. In spite of 
keeping fierce competition amongst them, however, it should be stressed that even 
these large players benefit from a close and complex form of articulation with other 
smaller actors in traditional or alternative markets, or even with the smaller produc-
ers of niche markets.26
A somehow different picture can be observed at the other zones of the food chain.
On the one hand, we can find identical scale effects in agriculture and the food 
raw-material trade, where a few actors reache such high levels of market power 
that it allowed a World Bank researcher to state: ‘In all major consumer markets, de-
creases in world commodity prices have been systematically much less transmitted 
than increases to domestic consumer prices. This asymmetric response which has 
been attributed to trade restrictions and bidding processing costs, appears rather 
to be largely caused by the behavior of international trading companies’ (Morisset, 
1997, p. 28).
Different is the case of corporations relying on patent ownership and involved 
in production. They have to deal with worldwide increasing competition and with 
the growing costs of research and development.27 This trend results in new highs 
of worldwide concentration of power through the formation of clusters of strategic 
alliances that are particularly important in the trade of grain/animal feed, seeds, 
agrochemicals and biotechnologies, as happened with Cargill and Monsanto and 
Novartis and ADM (Hendrickson and Heffernan, 2002).
The alliances can also be found in other segments of corporations directly in-
volved in production,28 such as the Beverage Partners Worldwide (BPW), a joint 
venture between Nestlé and Coca-Cola concerning ready-to-drink tea, or the Dairy 
Partners Americas (DPA) involving the Nestlé and New Zealand’s Fonterra Co-op-
erative Group Ltd.
Other Effects
Liberalization of trade (GATT and WTO) set in motion a global competitive dynamic 
that mirrors the image of the technological treadmill used by Cochrane (1979) to de-
scribe the historical evolution of agriculture in the US, with similar structural effects. 
The difference is that, nowadays, the effects of market competition are no longer 
restricted to national borders.
The result of these dynamics are new highs of de-territorialization of production 
of many food products, illustrated by the geographical concentration of intensive 
meat production based on globally sourced raw materials used as feedstuffs,29 thus 
intensifying and extending the changes in the geography of production previously 
remarked at the national level. This happens through the concentration of intensive 
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agricultural production in the most favourable areas, which is the ineluctable out-
come of the technological treadmill when actors are only submitted to market price 
stimuli. In this case, the goal of obtaining competitive advantage, or simply staying 
in business, forces producers into an incessant quest to increase productivity, con-
centrating production in better areas, and slowing down agricultural production 
levels or even abandoning agriculture in the less productive areas30 and, therefore, 
contributing to the socio-economic decline of the less favoured areas.
Another dimension of the global food chains is related with an unrestricted in-
ternational trade of food or raw materials to produce food, just to provide marginal 
gains to the holders of capital involved in this trade. In fact, international trade is 
based on a dynamic that depends on heavily subsidized infrastructures and limited 
and non-renewable energy sources to transport many goods that could be produced 
perfectly in the proximity of consumers. This apparent irrationality is justified on 
two grounds. One results from a private logic that does not care about social con-
cerns that justify that even a tiny gain from trade is enough to promote long distance 
trade. The other is more technically driven, and it is inherent in the negotiation pro-
cedures and logistics logic that involve prices, but also volumes and quality stand-
ards, that often are difficult to obtain timely in regional and, sometimes, even in 
national markets.31
This overall logic is hardly sustainable,32 unless transportation could find a new 
source of clean energy.
Since only few people are aware of the externalities involved in the global food 
system, it is highly improbable that this could generate an overall concern or consti-
tute the basis for public demonstrations. Therefore it is understandable the lack of 
political will to design policies able to counter activities that produce negative ex-
ternalities and, simultaneously, compensate the costs to producers of positive exter-
nalities. And when this exists, it is considered as equivalent to protectionist policies 
contrary to WTO agreements that only care about trade liberalization.33
Concluding Remarks: Identifying the Winners and Losers
Considering competition and scale effects, it is enough to identify winners and los-
ers, but it is also necessary to have in mind that this increased worldwide competi-
tion is played out among actors that are quite differentiated in terms of economic 
and financial weight along each supply chain. Broadly speaking, two different types 
of competition are present in the agri-food sector.
One type involves supply chains with the uncontested command of corporate 
distributors and or retailers; supply chains where all the other intermediate actors 
(service providers, transportation and logistics, processing industries and farmers) 
are relatively small, and thus cannot escape the grip of the corporations. Farmers are 
the weakest link in these chains, since they are squeezed between two forces: on the 
one hand, they have to comply with corporate retailers’ requirements (price, volume 
and quality standards); on the other hand, they suffer from the market power of the 
corporations that supply them with equipment and agro-inputs. This type of com-
petition relates essentially to short supply chains, mainly aimed at fresh products, 
which tend to be under the control of corporate distributors or retailers, relegating 
the other intermediate actors to a subordinate role.
The other type of competition, found in longer supply chains that do not have a 
sole controlling actor, as when one or more of the large corporations such as Nestlé, 
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Unilever, Coca-Cola, Pepsico, Conagra, ITB are present. In this case, only the small 
actors present in the chain are subject to price squeeze. The other large players, ei-
ther producer-driven or intermediate-driven corporations, prefer to try to find forms 
of supply-chain partnerships rather than entering into power games with players of 
identical financial and market power (Humphrey, 2006).
At the consumer level, the emergence of global food chains and the surge of cor-
porate retailers brought perceived benefits: consumers benefited from the presence 
of these large retailers in terms of lower prices, better services and wider choices, 
even if in a differentiated way. The ones in highly populated areas could benefit 
from competition among large players, while consumers served only by one large 
retailer can count on relatively higher prices. Nevertheless, hyper-valuing these 
benefits lead consumers to a sort of schizophrenic behaviour: as consumers we see 
people bargaining for these advantages, even when they are aware that they are 
linked to outcomes that they prefer rationally to refuse, such as economic, social and 
environmental losses and, particularly, damages to the democratic system that is 
probably the most troubling outcome of globalization.34
Shortly, the absolute losers of the process of globalization of food chains are the 
smaller actors that have been forced to give up and get out of business. Relative los-
ers are small retailers located at the downstream end of food chains facing unfair 
competition of corporate retailers, or farmers located at the upstream end of food 
chains suffering from uneven market power relations, either when dealing with in-
put supplier oligopolies or being obliged to comply with volume, time and quality 
standard requirements, as well as a price squeeze imposed by the corporate distribu-
tors or retailers.
But the small operators located in the less favoured areas are the ones suffering 
the most, since they share all the burdens and, simultaneously, are the worst placed 
to participate in the global supply chains, and/or to fully exploit the kind of oppor-
tunities that globalization can grant to small producers.
In addition, it must be noticed that consumers located in less favoured areas could 
be considered as a relative losers of the process, since retail competition is scarce or 
non-existent in these areas. Therefore, they pay more for identical goods than con-
sumers in places where competition really exists, as successive consumer surveys 
demonstrate.
 Large distributors or retailers are the obvious winners, the ones that were able to 
capture the many benefits derived from trade liberalization and from the dynamic 
associated with the above-mentioned technology-driven innovations.
That is, those actors were instrumental in exacerbating the competitive weakness 
of many producers who previously suffered only from competition restricted to na-
tional or protected European Common Market boundaries.
Increasing downstream market power in the food chains put pressure even on 
large corporations involved in agricultural input production (seed and agrochemi-
cals) or involved in food and beverage production. It pressured them to focus only 
on the most profitable segments of the supply chain, leaving to small actors the most 
risky and less profitable productive operations, and, furthermore, it pressured them 
to look for strategic alliances or supply-chain partnership with other giants.35
The emergence of the oligopolization of the large retailers stimulates the forma-
tion of larger ventures of their smaller suppliers through collective action, associat-
ing farmers, other intermediates or small retailers. It also urged other large corpo-
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rations to countervail the market power of the corporate distributors or retailers, 
therefore contributing to alliances between the large players.
To conclude it seems appropriate to call attention to the Achilles’ heel of this po-
litically driven globalization of food.
The first challenge comes from collective action of a number of movements, rang-
ing from more or less radical alternative movements to other grass-root and loosely 
organized rejection movements expressing the vitality of civil society that wants to 
have a word on the modes of production, marketing and consumption of food. 
Recently, since the onset of the current financial crisis the usual political argu-
ments that point to a globalization backlash have been reinforced greatly. World 
finance is far from being stabilized and fears of higher levels of protectionism are 
common.36 Expected higher commodity prices, i.e. oil, will increase transportation 
costs,37 therefore implying a severe adjustment of the global food chains (Moreira, 
2004). Hence, part of the global trade in food and raw materials is condemned to 
fade away, at least concerning the products with relatively higher weight and vol-
ume by ton.
In short, political dissatisfaction with globalization, financial and food crises, 
grass-root and alternative movements’ concerns about food production and con-
sumption, and higher transportation costs constitute elements that point to a deep 
change in the current food paradigm.
Notes
1. I will use chain to abbreviate commodity chain or supply chain, knowing that as Friedland (2001) 
recognizes ‘the nomenclature in this field is not yet settled down’. The terms interchangeably used in 
sociology are commodity systems, commodity chains, and the French filières, while economists also 
refer to value chains and supply chains even if usually their analysis ‘is devoid of human beings’.
2. Busch (2010) approach goes in the same direction.
3. By intermediation-driven global capital, I mean the types of global capital essentially based on inter-
mediation processes, either financial or commercial.
4. The article focuses on the major change drivers, which could lead the reader to think that changes fol-
lowed a linear path, predetermined and inevitable. The length of the article does not permit reference 
to the nuances and specificities of the processes, as can be observed in de Raymond (2007).
5. Among them, let me highlight the following: Friedland (1984, 2001), Bonanno et al. (1994a, 1994b) and 
Morgan et al. (2008).
6. Well-known literature allows me to skip explanations of the main globalization drivers. Among those 
that the reader might find useful are: Bonanno et al. (1994a, 1994b), Clapp and Fuchs (2009) and 
Busch (2010) concerning agrifood; Gereffi et al. (1994) concerning the distinction between producer-
driven and buyer-driven commodity chains; the edited books of Lechner and Boli (2000) and Held 
and McGrew (2000) where other dimensions of globalization are also treated; and, finally, Rodrik 
(2002, 2007) and Stiglitz (2002, 2006) for an economic perspective critical of the orthodoxy.
7. ‘By the late 1980s a remarkable convergence of views had developed around a set of policy princi-
ple that John Williamson, infelicitously termed ‘Washington Consensus”… Toward the end of the 
1990s, this list was augmented in the thinking of multilateral agencies and policy economists with 
a series of so-called second-generation reforms that were more institutional in nature and targeted 
at problems of “good governance”’ (in Rodrik, 2007). The first guideline extensively imposed by the 
International Monetary Fund’s structural adjustment policies involve 10 principles: fiscal discipline; 
reorientation of public expenditures; tax reform; interest rate liberalization; unified and competitive 
exchanges rates; trade liberalization; openness to direct foreign investment; privatization; deregula-
tion; and secure property rights (Rodrik, 2007, pp. 16–17). However, the way it was applied by the 
IMF was strongly criticized by authors such as Stiglitz (2002), turn the expression a label of market 
fundamentalism.
8. Johnson (2009) underlines that ‘From 1973 to 1985 the financial sector never earned more than 16 
percent of domestic corporate profits. In 1986, that figure reached 19 percent… This decade, it reached 
41 percent’. See also Stiglitz (2010), for a deep analysis of the crisis, the issues of financial regulation 
 Changes in Food Chains in the Context of Globalization 145
of those too big to fail, and the responsibility of the economics orthodoxy. Allais (1993) calls attention 
to the role of automatic software on finance volatility and crisis, and Sethi (2010) quotes a Financial 
Times article stating that ‘After a detailed four-month review of the flash crash, looking at market 
data streams tick-by-tick and down to the millisecond, the SEC concluded that a single order in the 
e-mini S&P 500 futures market ignited an inferno of panic selling. It was over in about seven minutes, 
and $1,000bn was up in smoke’.
9. An interesting perspective comes from Flora and Bendini (2007), who consider changes as corre-
sponding to a fundamental shift in the value chains, with farms forced to pass from market conven-
tion to industrial convention demands. I think that this perspective is based on conventions theory 
rather than in parallel with the approach developed here.
10. About the rising political importance of the civil society, see Friedland (2008).
11. That is, small family farmers, traditional local markets and artisanal production or small retailers, 
mainly family based. 
12. See the discussion about the needed regulation of the institutions too big to fail (among others, John-
son, 2009; Stiglitz, 2010).
13. Several cases of vertical integration along the commodity chain illustrate this claim, such as in the 
automotive sector, information technologies and clothing industries where the leader corporation 
concentrate on design and marketing, while production is left to independent or quasi-independent 
producers. The same happens in many examples of food production, namely meat and broiler pro-
duction, where the riskier part of the chain is usually reserved for autonomous producers (Bonanno 
et al., 1994, pp. 7–8; Gouveia, 1994, pp. 130–131; Heffernan  and Constance, 1994).
14. As happens at the upstream of the agri-food supply chains with giants such as Bayer (Aventis), Syn-
genta (Novartis and Astra Zeneca), and Monsanto.
15. Reich (2007, pp. 53–55) refers that ‘[s]ize was no longer an entry barrier’, but he also acknowledges, 
exemplifying with Wal-Mart, that ‘[l]arger size can still be useful to a firm – but not because of pro-
duction scale, and not to keep competition at bay so prices can be raised’.
16. As illustrated by what happened to financial and environmental regulations during the George W. 
Bush Administration, or TNCs delocalization to countries where environmental regulations are not 
enforced.
17. Consisting of standards, certifications and accreditations with the involvement of state and private 
institutions. Particularly relevant for globalization of food is GLOBALGAP, which substituted Eurep-
GAP as created by several European market chains.
18. With savings of 0.3–0.5% of the shipping value (Crafts and Venables, 2001, p. 26).
19. Electronic Data Interchange is the usual way of doing business by corporations such as Procter & 
Gamble, Colgate, Sony, Johnson Wax and Royal Brands when negotiating with Continente, the larger 
Portuguese retailer (Rousseau, 1997, p. 105). Also worth mentioning is factory gate pricing, a cost-
saving procedure where products are collected by the retailer at the factory gates of the suppliers (le 
Blanc et al., 2006).
20. See Busch (2010) explaining the slow pace of RFID adoption.
21. About the significance of the nanotechnologies see Busch (2010).
22. Identical scale effects are observed in the relations between African exporters and producers of fresh 
vegetables and UK supermarkets (Dolan and Humphrey, 2001).
23. A good example of this restructuring is given by Harvey et al. (2002, pp. 86–95) when referring to the 
emergence of the Greenery International or the AENOR label.
24. Busch (2010, p. 336) quoting Grievink relays that ‘70 buying desks for supermarket chains now con-
trol most of Europe’s food supply’, and Fuchs et al. (2009, p. 32) quoting MacMillan point to ‘110 
buying desks, which act as intermediaries between 3.2 million farmers and the consumer’.
25. This does not mean that all early innovators were able to achieve an oligopolistic level, some failed 
due to bad management or poor strategies, while others have been incorporated into larger opera-
tions through the merger and acquisition movement that characterizes the financially led business 
world.
26. de Raymond (2007) provides illustration of this kind of articulation. Conroy et al. (1996) show that 
in Central America larger exporters and importers frequently use traditional markets to obtain the 
volumes they need while giving preference to contracts with large players.
27. Increasingly substituting state-led R&D.
28. Even when the bulk of their profits come from non-productive activities.
29. Heffernan et al. (1999) note that 97% of US broiler production is concentrated in 40 firms, using 250 
processing facilities.
30. Productivity calculated not in terms of agricultural production potential but measured by current 
market-driven prices regardless of the positive and negative externalities incurred by the fact that 
production is intensified in some places, and because the other face of the coin is the extensification 
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or abandonment of areas perfectly suitable to produce foodstuffs or raw materials. Externality is an 
economic concept that refers to the effects, positive or negative, provoked by economic activities that 
are not valued through market prices.
31. An example of this ‘irrationality’ happens when a small flower retailer in Portugal orders Mediter-
ranean flowers from their usual supplier and the order is satisfied and delivered by a Dutch lorry 
that transport the flowers from the Netherlands after being produced and shipped from a production 
facility located some kilometers away from the final sale point.
32. This is due to the negative externalities involved in trade, namely long distance trade. Also worth 
mentioning are the perverse effects of subsidizing bio-fuel production on climate and food consump-
tion.
33. As happens with much of the defense of the European model of agricultural production where exter-
nalities justify ‘protectionist’ policies.
34. See Reich (2007). Showing identical concerns, see also the trilema of globalization defined by Rodrik 
(2002).
35. See note 13 as well as Hendrickson and Heffernan (2002), Maloni and Benton (2000) and Mulrony and 
Chaddad (2005).
36. Currency disputes at the recent G20 summit in Seoul are an example.
37. Rubin and Tal (2008) in a recent newsletter note that ‘in tariff-equivalent terms, the explosion in global 
transport costs has effectively offset all the trade liberalization efforts of the last three decades. Not 
only does this suggest a major slowdown in the growth of world trade, but also a fundamental rea-
lignment in trade patterns’, and ‘[o]ver the last three years, every one dollar rise in world oil prices 
has fed directly into a 1% rise in transport costs’.
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